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III.—SINGLE WORD VERSUS PHRASE.

The object of this paper is the discussion of a problem of semantic equivalence. That problem is to discover why, to express a concept, a single word is used in some instances and a clause or phrase in others. The single words considered will be chiefly nouns and adjectives. The material for investigation was taken in the first instance from Plautus, *Rudens*, and Cicero, *Ad Familiares*, III; but it has been augmented by examples from other sources whenever they seemed pertinent.

The most convenient starting-point for the discussion is the participle, especially the present participle. A participle whose context does not impose upon it any necessary limitation of time, cause, manner, concession, or other of the specific meanings according to which participles are generally classified in grammars, might be called an undifferentiated participle. Though subject to the influence of the meaning of the stem, it contains the possibility of any of the more specific meanings. It is seldom, however, that the participle is found in this purely fluid condition; it generally receives from its context a tendency in one direction rather than another. *Ad. Fam.*, III, 11, 2: *Complexus igitur sum cogitatione te absentem*; “absentem” is here in an undifferentiated state, “in your absence”; a slight change of context would justify “though absent,” “because absent.” *Ru.* 71: *Vehemens sum exoriens, quom occido vehementior*; “exoriens” is clearly defined as a temporal participle because of “quom occido” in the following clause. *Ad Fam.* III, 6, 4: *quum interea, credo equidem, malevoli homines (late enim patet hoc vitium et est in multis), sed tamen probabilem materiam nacti sermonis, ignari meae constantiae, conabantur alienare a te voluntatem meam*; here “nacti” might be defined as of attendant circumstance, but has a causal implication. *Ibid.* 10, 10: *qua humanitate tulit contentionem meam pro Milone, adversantem interdum actionibus suis*; *adversantem* is clearly concessive, the note of concession being struck in *qua humanitate tulit*. In *ibid.* 12, 2: *itaque quemadmodum expediam exitum huius institutae orationis non reperio*, “institutae” might be rendered “though I have begun it.”

A participle is potentially a clause, but it requires further definition from its context. Any adjective, also, may be expanded into a clause; but the participle, being in general somewhat less definite than the adjective, disintegrates rather more readily. A good example is given above of the participle balanced against a temporal clause: Ru. 71 *vehemens sum exoricens quom occido vehementior*; cf. *ibid.* 771 *quom coniecturam egomet mecum facio* with Cic. *De Oratore*, I, 1 *cogitanti mihi saepenumero et memoria vetera repetenti*. In the same way an adjective may be expanded into a clause, though with this difference, that the adjective will remain itself as one element in the analytical expression or give place to some similar word, usually an adjective, while the participle is actually broken up by the use of the appropriate finite verb. Plautus furnishes many examples of the use of a clause where the simple adjective would seem sufficient: Ru. 26/7: *facilius si qui pius est a dis supplicans / quam qui scelestust inveniet veniam sibi*; *ibid.*, 290, *omnibus modis qui pauperes sunt homines miseri vivont*.

In a previous article¹ I have discussed the frequent semantic equivalence of the adjective and the participle, and also the use of the noun as a participle. The equivalence of adjectival and participial terminations may be seen in such examples as Ru. 409: *timidas, egenteis, uvidas, eiectas, exanimatas* (where participle and adjective are mixed together in such a way that any distinction in the semantic value of their terminations must be made on the ground of their use in other contexts), and in words such as *adolescens, sapiens*, or the like, of participial formation, but used chiefly as nouns or adjectives. In the latter instances the use of the participle as a noun may be studied; the use of the noun as a participle may be seen, e. g., in Ru. 225/6: *neque eam usquam invenio, neque quo eam neque quo quaeram consultumst / neque quem rogitem responsorem quemquam interea convenio*; here "responsorem" is a specialized "responsurum."

A prepositional phrase may be used as the semantic equivalent of an adjective; Cic. *ad Fam.* III, 10, 1: *quod nihil tam praeter opinionem meam accidere potuit*; *id. Ac.* 2, 4, 10: *non . . . conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est eis, qui*

¹ A. J. P., XL, pp. 373-395, Verbals in -tor, -ax, -dus, and -ns.

placere volunt, tam adversarium. In each instance there is a qualifier of "nihil"; but in one instance this qualifier is put in the form of a word, in the other in that of a prepositional phrase.² In "tam praeter opinionem meam" the pronominal adjective is not otiose, and could not readily be drawn into a compound, but the phrase would be intelligible without "meam" as easily as in *Nepos*, *Milt.*, 2, 5: *etsi praeter opinionem res ceciderat*. "Opiniosus"³ is doubtful in *Cicero*, and would mean "fixed in opinion, obstinate." "Opinabilis" occurs first in *Cicero*, and seems quasi-technical. "Inopinus" is poetic and late. "Inopinabilis" occurs first in *Gellius*, and is not always technical; e. g. *XVII*, 9, 18: *est et alia in monumentis rerum Graecarum profunda quaedam et inopinabilis latebra, barbarico astu excogitata*. "Inopinatus" occurs in *Cicero*, both as an adjective and, in its neuter form, as a noun: *Par. V*, 1, 35, *nec hoc tam re est quam dictu inopinatum atque mirabile*, and *Tusc. III*, 31, 76, *nihil inopinati accidisse*. Here, then, no difference can be found in meaning between "inopinatum" and "praeter opinionem"; "meam" makes the expression somewhat more specific, and cannot apparently be incorporated in the phrase when the latter is reduced to adjectival form; though it is so easy to understand the pronominal adjective that no substantial difference is made if it is omitted except where it is emphatic.⁴ *Plautus* furnishes a good example

² The agreement would run on parallel lines if "tam praeter opinionem" were taken adverbially, as modifying "accidere."

³ *Ac.* 2, 47, 143.

⁴ "Praeter opinionem" would be spoken of as two words, "inopinabilis" or "inopinatum" as one. This difference in nomenclature marks a correct, formal distinction. From a semantic point of view there may be no difference. Postgate (*Bréal, Semantics*, translated by Cust, Appendix, p. 329) proposes to call the expression of a single idea or notion a "rheme." This terminology, however, while it might be convenient for an investigator, would probably prove confusing; because ideas, notions, or things, themselves of varying complexity, are defined as one by us for the purposes of our convenience. Cf. Sidgwick, "The Use of Words in Reasoning," Chap. II, § 13, "It is in our habit of viewing facts which admit of being concisely described as simple facts that the danger chiefly resides; and the convenience—amounting in some cases to little short of necessity,—which justifies this habit merely increases its effective misleading force." It is difficult to say what is a word (cf. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*², I, pp. 599 ff., and Bloomfield,

of semantic equivalence between "insperata" and "praeter spem": Ru. 400: *nam multa praeter spem scio multis bona evenisse*, and Most. 197: *insperata accidunt magis saepe quam quae speres*.

Ru. 704: *te ex concha natam esse autumant*; *ibid.* 739-41: *quid ego ex te audio? hanc Athenis esse natam liberam. / mea popularis, obsecro, haec est? non tu Cyrenensis es? / immo Athenis natus, altusque educatusque Atticis*. Here there is an exact equivalence between "Athenis natam" and "Cyrenensis," and a less close parallel between either of these expressions and "ex concha natam." "Cyrenensis" might be translated "born at Cyrene"; but that is because of its context—"Athenis natam" preceding, and "Athenis natus" following. The termination *-ensis* may, on occasion, be the equivalent of "natus" with the ablative, with or without a preposition. In itself, it is not so specific. It may mean "dwelling at," or "presiding over," as Ru. 615: *pro Cyrenenses populares*, and *ibid.* 713: *de senatu Cyrenensi quemvis opulentum virum*. "*Conchensis" could be understood as an attribute of Venus; but an example of an *-ensis* adjective formed upon the stem of a common noun and meaning "born at" seems not to occur.⁵

Ru. 315: *qui tres secum homines duceret, c(h)lamydatus cum machaeris*; cf. Cic. ad Quint. frat. 2, 8, 2: *machaerophoricentum sequentibus*. "Chlamys" and "machaera" are both found in Plautus. A prepositional phrase is used in Ru. 315 probably because the added detail came into the speaker's mind after "chlamydatus"; that is, the phrase represents an added act of associative thinking. He had men with him—they wore the chlamys—and they had daggers. Cf. Pl. Ps. 158: *te cum securi caudicali*; Ov. Met. XII, 460: *securiferumque Pyracten*; Val. Flac. 5, 138: *securigeras . . . catervas*. In view of "chlamydatus," "clypeatus," and others, "*machaeratus" could scarcely have been a cause of hesitation to Plautus.

"The Study of Language," pp. 103 ff.), and not less difficult to say what is a thing. This fact is one cause of the persistent intrusion of metaphysics into grammar.

⁵The *-ensis* adjectives formed upon common-noun stems listed in Gradenwitz have been examined as far as they could be traced in Harper's *Lexicon*. They are not numerous, and are frequently not classical.

In Cic. ad Fam. III, 5, 1: *ibi mihi praesto fuit L. Lucilius cum litteris mandatisque tuis*, "cum" discharges a more important function than in "*cum machaeris*" above. Here the use of a single word in place of the phrase "*cum litteris mandatisque tuis*" is so difficult as to be practically impossible in Latin for several reasons. In the first place, the pronominal adjective offers a difficulty, as noticed above; secondly, the adjectives formed from "littera" in classical times derive their meaning from "litterae" "learning," or "littera" "a letter of the alphabet," and not from "litterae" "a letter, epistle"; thirdly, the dvandva compound is scarcely to be found in Latin.⁶ When the necessity for some convenient term for "a postman" was felt, "tabellarius" was formed from "tabellae," probably because adjectives formed from "litterae" had been appropriated for other uses.

Cic. ad Fam. III, 4, 1: *pridie nonas Iunias cum essem Brundisi litteras tuas accepi*; *ibid.* 10, 2: *Q. Servilius perbrevis mihi a te litteras reddidit*; *ibid.* 1, 2: *ut mihi reddidit a te litteras plenas et amoris et officii*; in such examples as these, the preposition seems to be used where there is some emphasis on the actual transmission of the letters,⁷ though "accipere" is used with the adjective where "a te" might have been expected on the analogy of "reddere a te." A good example of the use of a prepositional phrase which would be difficult to reduce to a single word because it mentions details that would not in the nature of things occur with great frequency is ad Fam. III, 9, 1: *quas ex itinere antequam ex Asia egressus es ad me litteras misisti unas de legatis a me prohibitis proficisci, alteras de Appianorum aedificatione impedita, legi perinvitus*.

Ad Fam. III, 7, 3: *quid habuit iniquitatis me scribere ne facerent antequam ego rem causamque cognossem? non poteram, credo, ante hiemem*. Here the adverbial clause "*antequam ego rem causamque cognossem*" is balanced by "*ante hiemem*"; substitute for "hiemem" "*quam hiems venisset*" and the parallel is complete; this is however unnecessary; "ante

⁶ Lindsay, L. L., p. 361.

⁷ An examination of all the examples of the type "*tuas litteras*," "*litteras a te*" in Cic. ad Fam. III, yielded nothing of interest except the fact that a preposition was used wherever "reddere" appeared in the phrase.

hiemem” performs the necessary function quite as well, is briefer, and rhetorically quite as effective. Why have an adverbial clause in the one case and a preposition with its noun in the other? It will not do to say that “*hiems*” expresses a concept less complex than that expressed by the clause. Its lesser complexity is merely a matter of phonetics; semantically “*hiems*” is quite as complex as the clause against which it is balanced. The phenomena summed up in “*hiems*” are of frequent occurrence and considerable importance; a name must be found for this body of phenomena, and is found by taking what was originally the name of the most noticeable object of the winter. For the “*antequam*” clause, “*ante meam cognitionem*” might logically and etymologically have been substituted; but “*cognitio*” has a technical connotation. Nor is the clause quoted particularly definite in character; not more so than “*aedilitas*” in “*aedilitas mea*,” Cic., Att. 12, 17: *ante aedilitatem meam*. It is, however, of relatively infrequent occurrence. This seems to be the reason for the use of the clause. In such a clause as ad Fam. III, 6, 4: *antequam in provinciam veni*, nothing would be gained in explicitness and something would be lost in brevity by the substitution of “*ante meum in provinciam adventum*.” “*Adventus in provinciam*” is not reduced to univocal form,⁸ though the concept occurs frequently; probably because some genitive or adjective is required to make the meaning explicit.

Ad Fam. III, 6, 5: *eoque ad te tardius scripsi, quod cotidie te ipsum exspectabam, cum interea ne litteras quidem ullas accepi quae me docerent quid ageres aut ubi te visurus essem*; Cicero wrote to Claudius after some delay; the cause of the delay is given in the *quod* clause; “*exspectabam*” is modified by the *cum* clause. Cause may be expressed in a single word, but in such instances the context furnishes the implication of cause; e. g. Hor. Carm. I, 5, 9: *qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea*; since he is inexperienced (*credulus*), he thinks you all gold. So “*prudens*” Hor. Serm. II, 3, 206: *prudens placavi sanguine divos*; so probably “*cari*,” Hor. Carm. I, 24, 2: *Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus / tam cari capitis*, i. e., since it is so dear.

⁸ I have ventured to use the word “univocal” to avoid circumlocution, though I am not aware that it appears in any standard dictionary. It serves as another illustration of my thesis.

Concession also may be expressed in one word, especially such a word as "invitus," which readily carries such implication; ad Fam. III, 10, 3: coactus a me invitissimo decessisset; *ibid.* XIII, 63: eum ego a me invitissimus dimisi.⁹ In the clause quoted above (ad Fam., III, 6, 5) the quod clause is used because the idea to be expressed is specific, and of insufficiently frequent occurrence to have obtained a separate word for its expression. So in the cum clause the concept to be expressed does not frequently occur; the object of "docerent" is complex, each separate secondary object being a clause, and the second clause itself complicated by both "ubi" and "te." That is, while everything in the sentence except "ad te scripsi" modifies "scripsi," the whole, which presents itself to the mind as one concept when the idea is grasped, is far too complex to be expressed by one word; and the separate parts of the concept, in the same way, are either too complex or too specific. If the total concept were one that came into the mind frequently without any change, in time, no doubt, a more convenient form of expression would have been found. A briefer expression of cause, though still too complex to be put into one word, is found in such phrases as ad Fam. III, 9, 4, sed id feci adductus auctoritate et consilio tuo.

A concept of some complexity expressed in one word is found in almost any abstract term that means anything; e. g. "urbanitas," as in ad Fam. III, 9, 1: aspectus videlicet urbis tibi tuam pristinam urbanitatem reddidit; the analysis of this concept would be found to yield among other things a pleasant emotional ingredient. Cf. *ibid.* III, 7, 5: homo, mea sententia, summa prudentia, multa etiam doctrina, plurimo rerum usu, addo urbanitatem, quae est virtus. *Ibid.* III, 8, 4: nihil addidi, nisi quod publicani me rogarunt, cum Samum ad me venissent, ut de tuo edicto totidem verbis transferrem in meum. In the foregoing example, what Cicero added is not directly stated, but hinted in descriptive detail. Plaut. Ru. 601/2: videtur ad me simia aggredirier / rogare scalas ut darem utendas sibi; the sentence appears somewhat pleonastic, but is not absolutely so. In the context, "scalas" would be understood without "ut darem

⁹ In such a clause as Cic. Par. 5, 1: soli igitur hoc contingit sapienti ut nihil faciat invitus, the idea of concession is scarcely felt.

utendas sibi"; but *rogare* prefers a clause to a noun as inner object. What has happened here, probably on account of the limitations of usage, is that the concept has been rather fully expressed, instead of being indicated by one word.

The terms "complex" and "specific," each of which is of course relative, have been used with this distinction: a concept is complex when it contains various elements, any one of which is incomplete without reference to the others; it is specific when its chief use is to hold clearly in view some detail which is necessary to express the dominant idea of the speaker. Specific clauses do not necessarily exclude complexity. The difference is often chiefly a difference of emphasis. Ru. 1110: *ubi sunt signa qui parentes noscere haec possit suos*; the clause "*qui . . . suos*" is not more complex than "*militaria*" in "*signa militaria*." It is more specific, limiting the application of "*signa*" to the purpose then in hand. It did not secure univocal expression, presumably because it did not occur frequently enough.

Cic. pro Milone, 54: (quoted in another connection by Postgate, p. xxix, Preface to Cust's translation of Bréal's *Semantics*) *si haec non gesta audiretis, sed picta videretis, tamen appareret uter esset insidiator, uter nihil cogitaret mali*: in the phrases "*esset insidiator*" and "*nihil cogitaret mali*," "*insidiator*" is a noun, which indicates precisely enough the performer of a certain kind of action, sufficiently frequent to require and obtain a separate classification and name; "*nihil cogitaret mali*" expresses a much wider and vaguer concept, including here the idea of "*non-insidiator*." There is no noun to signify definitely a non-planner of evil. A negative prefix is readily adopted by adjectives, but scarcely at all by nouns.¹⁰ In this instance "*esset insidiator*" is really more specific than "*nihil cogitaret mali*." The two concepts are analyzed into speech by different methods. Ru. 538/9: *qui auderem tecum in navem*

¹⁰ See Lindsay, L. L., p. 615. There are some interesting examples of semi-agglutination of the negative with the noun in Greek; e. g., Eur. Hipp. 196-7 *δι' ἀπειροσύνην ἄλλου βίοντος | κοῦκ ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ὑπὸ γαίας*. Thuc. I, 137: *καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν . . . τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν*; *ibid.*, III, 95: *διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν*; *ibid.* V, 35: *κατὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ἀλλήλοισι οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν*. See also H. A. Hamilton, *The Negative Compounds in Greek* (J. H. U. diss.), pp. 31 f.

ascendere / qui a fundamento mi usque movisti mare? Here "qui . . . mare" states a specific detail which is of importance to Charmides. It is somewhat akin in tenor to ἐνοσίγαιος. The latter, however, denotes a regular attribute of Poseidon, and has received univerbal expression. The former denotes an isolated occurrence, states it explicitly, and was not generalized into an epithet. Ru. 892/3: bene factum et volup est me hodie his mulierculis / tetulisse auxilium; grammatically speaking, "tetulisse" is the subject of "est"; psychologically, the whole concept expressed in "me . . . auxilium" is a unit; it expresses one act of Daemones, and is not more complex than "amatio," Ru. 1204: nimis paene inepta atque odiosa eius amatiost. Ru. 1291/2: istic scelestus liber est, ego qui in mari prehendi / rete atque excepi vidulum ei darei negatis quicquam: here "istic scelestus" is balanced by "ego qui in mari prehendi rete atque excepi vidulum," and "liber est" by "ei darei negatis quicquam." "Scelestus" is emotional and not specific; while Gripus represents his own merit by recounting the achievement which has a bearing on the situation; so Trachalio is freed, but no reward is given to Gripus. If grasping a rope and pulling a box out of the sea were a matter of frequent occurrence, some convenient expression for the person performing the action would, arguing from the analogy of other nomina agentis, probably have arisen. The concept here expressed is not more complex than that represented by "sacrificulus" or "pollinctor," probably not more specific than that represented by the latter. Gripus is annoyed, and has no specific charge against Trachalio to balance the qui clause, so he says "scelestus," which here means nothing except that he does not like Trachalio. It should be noted further that the idea of concession is plainly implicit both in "scelestus" and in the qui clause. A somewhat similar balance of adjective and clause is found Ru. 920/1: nimis homo nilist quist piger . . . / vigilare decet hominem qui volt sua temperi conficere officia; there the qui clause is the antithesis to "piger"; there are several adjectives that might serve for the qui clause, e. g., "acer"; but the clause is more specific; it is the idea prominent in Gripus' mind (cf. 915, nam ut de nocte multa impigreque exsurrexi); the psychological, not the logical, antithesis to "piger" is required here; possibly, too, the decorative impulse

has something to do with the variety of expression. Cic. ad Fam. III, 4, 1: *meum studium erga te et officium tametsi multis iam rebus spero tibi esse cognitum, tamen in iis maxime declarabo quibus plurimum significare potuero tuam mihi existimationem et dignitatem carissimam esse*: to a hearer or reader acquainted with the circumstances to which Cicero refers, "multis" suggests a greater complexity than the relative clause, but the latter is specific—its precision is much greater than that of "multis"; though the concept expressed is rather complex, does not occur with great frequency, and has no univocal expression. Ad Fam. III, 10, 1: *multaque mihi veniebant in mentem quamobrem istum laborem tibi etiam honori putarem fore*, "quamobrem . . . fore" is not more complex than "salutaria," *ibid.* 8, 4: *quo in capite sunt quaedam nova salutaria civitatibus*"; it is more specific. Ru. 721: *exemplo hercle ego follem pugillatorium faciam*: "folles pugillatorius" is not more complex or specific than "gladius." It did not in Latin require mention so frequently; nor, historically, has "punching-bag" required mention in English as frequently as "sword." Ad. Fam. III, 3, 2: *ego C. Pomptinum, legatum meum, Brundisi exspectabam, eumque ante Kal. Iun. Brundisium venturum arbitrabar*; place is here expressed by a case form, time by a prepositional phrase. Further, the expression of time in analytical form differs from many instances in which a compound is used; e. g., Cic. ad Fam. XV, 4, 9: *ex antelucano tempore usque ad horam diei x*; Seneca, Epist. 65, 1: *hesternum diem divisi cum mala valetudine*; *antemeridianum illa sibi vindicavit*: *postmeridiano mihi cessit*. The list might be extended indefinitely.

As may be gathered from what has been said, the novelty or infrequency of occurrence of a concept may lead to its expression in a clause, while other concepts quite as complex and quite as specific find expression in one word. Ru. 965: *et qui invenit hominem novi, et dominus qui nunc est scio*; "inventor" does not appear in Plautus. Cf. *ibid.* 313/5 *adolecentem / . . . qui tres secum homines duceret*; "qui tres secum homines duceret" adds a simple detail to the picture, but a man does not lead three men with sufficient frequency, nor is the matter of sufficient importance, to warrant a special term for "leading three men." Terms such as *centurio* and *decurio*

developed because the concept represented by them was of sufficient importance and frequency of occurrence to need a convenient method of expression. The concept expressed above by "qui invenit" finds expression (though in a generalized form) in "inventor," Ter. Eun. 1035: o Parmeno mi, o mearum voluptatum omnium / inventor, inceptor, perfector, scis me, in quibus sum gaudiis? The free use of "inventor" may have been hampered by its technical or quasi-technical application.¹¹ Ru. 118/9: isti(c) infortunium qui praefestinet ubi erus adsit praeloqui; the concept in the qui clause is not more complex nor more specific than others expressed univervally; "he who hastens to speak before his master" should be no more difficult of univerval expression than "he who is learned in the law," or "he who heals the sick"; praefestinet adds one detail to the picture, but the concept does not occur frequently, nor is it important.

Thus far it would seem that the chances that any concept will be expressed in a single word rather than in a phrase are inversely as its complexity, precision, and infrequency of occurrence. Logically considered, thus much, at least, is true of adjectives and nouns. But language is primarily a matter not of logic, but of psychology, and psychology must take account of emotion.¹² Emotion may affect the expression of the concept

¹¹ Cf. Hor. Serm. I, 10, 48: inventore minor; id., Carm. III, 30, 10-14: dicar . . . princeps; Quint. Inst. Orat. III, 7, 16: quae solus quis aut primus, aut certe cum paucis fecisse videatur; ibid. 18: afferent laudem liberi parentibus, urbes conditoribus, leges latoribus, artes inventoribus, necnon instituta quoque auctoribus.

¹² Adjectives, for example, might be classified as intellectual and emotional. The prevailing characteristic of the emotional adjective is its vagueness; a precise adjective must be intellectual; e. g., trilibris, longimanus. When such a term is used as an emotional adjective it loses precision. For example, "sescenta" Plaut. Ps. 632: quasi mihi non sescenta tanta soli soleant credier; "rotundus," Hor. Serm. II, 7, 86; in Greek, *τεράγωνος*, Sim. 12, Bergk; so in such phrases as Plaut. Cas. 114, ex sterculino effosse, where emotional congruity makes the metaphor fitting. Cf. Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, p. 107: Ich unterscheide also am Worte dreierlei: 1. den begrifflichen Inhalt von grösserer oder geringerer Bestimmtheit . . . 2. den Nebensinn, 3. den Gefühlswert (oder Stimmungsgehalt); ibid. pp. 114-5: Von einigen Ausdrücken könnte man sagen, dass sie überhaupt nur Gefühlswert besäßen, oder besser, dass ihr begrifflicher Inhalt ganz im Gefühlswert

in two ways: it may lead to the use of a blanket term, such as an emotional adjective; or it may lead to the statement of some detail of interest in analytic form for emphasis. The second method differs only in degree from any statement of detail in a relative clause, since this is always determined by the interest of the speaker; but in emotional statement unnecessary analyses are oftener made. A good example is Ru. 1291/2, analyzed above. "Scelestus" indicates merely Gripus' dislike of Trachalio; "qui in mari prehendi rete atque excepi vidulum" the act of the fruits of which he has, he thinks, been unjustly deprived. Such partial analysis of a concept by the addition of some detail of interest to give emphasis is common: Ru. 1236, *fiunt transennae ubi decipiuntur dolis*, or *ibid.* 28/9, *qui estis boni, / quique aetatem agitis cum pietate et cum fide*; in the latter example the *qui* clause is merely a restatement of "boni" to give emphasis.¹³ Ru. 651-3 furnishes a good example of a statement that might logically have been made in one word. The epithets indicate the turning about of the concept in the mind of the speaker to find some process of analysis by which to make the expression of disgust more vigorous; finally he throws out the logical kernel in one word, which represents all that the concept logically contains. He throws this out after having prepared a suitable emotional atmosphere in his hearer's mind, as though in despair of getting epithets to do the subject justice: *fraudis, sceleris, parricidi, periuri plenis(sumus) / legirupa, impudens, impurus, inverecundis-sumus, / uno verbo absolvam lenost: quid illum porro praedicem?* "Turba" has a rather vague connotation; but Vergil's analysis of it in one well-known passage gives the logical details and excites the appropriate emotion with no waste of epithets;

aufgegangen sei. Bei Schimpfwörtern z. B. ist der grossen Menge die sie gebraucht, der eigentliche Sinn unbekannt . . . Vielleicht beruht die kräftige, fast mystische Wirkung mancher Schimpfwörter gerade darauf, dass im Grunde kein Mensch mehr weiss, was sie eigentlich besagen.

"Under the influence of emotion it is easier to throw together epithets than to think consecutively. Epithets, however, make no appeal to the mind of an unprejudiced hearer. He wants to know the facts. So the plain statement of a case with well-chosen words is more effective than much mere rhetoric.

Aen. VI, 305 sqq.: huc omnis turba ad ripas effusa ruebat / matres atque viri, defunctaque corpora vita / magnanimum heroum, pueri innuptaeque puellae / impositique rogis iuvenes ante ora parentum. Vergil sees the crowd at the Styx. "Turba" merely classifies it generally; the specific details must be given by analysis, and the appropriate emotion by a proper choice of vocabulary. Examples of logical analysis for the purpose of description or definition are too common to discuss here. Outside of scientific treatises they do not often occur without some irrelevant or picturesque detail. See, e. g., Cicero's description of the Asiatic style, Bru. 95, 325.

Examples have been given above of concepts of some complexity and of others of considerable precision expressed univernally. Those whose novelty requires expression by the use either of a clause or of a new word will be considered later. One case, however, will be examined here of the univernbal expression of concepts that are complex, specific in that they are of definite, individual reference, and so infrequent in occurrence that one of them, at least, is quoted in Harper's *Lexicon* as a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*—Ad Fam. III, 7, 5: ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus quam ornamenta virtutis existimas? The obvious difficulty with words like "Appietas" or "Lentulitas" is that they presuppose for their comprehension acquaintance with a particular person, object, or event. Given such acquaintance, they are clear and forcible; and the more thorough the acquaintance of the hearer with the person, object, or event, and with the speaker, the more exactly can he analyze for himself the concept which they suggest. In the case of men and events whose fame is wide, they may be used to good effect with a large audience. "Johnsonian" is readily understood by the majority of educated, English-speaking people; its emotional quality must be inferred from the context. To Miss Jenkyns of Cranford it was a term of honor, stately, dignified; to some modern readers it means only turgid, sesquipedalian. Words of this sort are probably coined in every house at some time. Their range of use is at first confined to those who are acquainted with the circumstances of their origin.¹⁴ The vast

¹⁴ Zumal in Bevölkerungsgruppen, die abgeschlossen leben, bei Studenten, Soldaten, Handwerksburschen, gewinnen gewisse Ausdrücke

majority of them die out. Here and there one is preserved, and sometimes used and understood long after the occasion of its formation is forgotten. The adjective "Pickwickian" probably, the verb "burke" certainly, is used by those who have no notion of its origin.

There are two forms of expression in Latin which stand somewhere between the clause and the single word. One is the adjective with "res." "Res" (except in the sense of property) has in itself, when combined with an adjective, practically no meaning. It is a device whereby an adjective is enabled to carry the meaning of a noun; e. g., Ru. 95: *ubi rem divinam se facturum dixerat*; Cic. *ad Fam. III, 8, 9: de rebus urbanis quod me certiores fecisti*; and *passim*. This use of "res" is a convenient device, and capable of wide application. The other device is that of the indefinite expressions which are frequently agglutinated into one word, and which are of comparatively limited application; e. g., Ru. 561: *nescioquem metuentes miserae*; *ibid. 83/4: pro di immortales, tempestatem quouismodi / Neptunus nobis nocte hac misit proxuma*; *ibid. 321: cum istiusmodi virtutibus operisque natus qui si[e]t*. The last expressions are meaningless unless the reference is clear, and "nescioquis," which does not require such reference, is in itself totally indefinite; all these compounds differ from the "res" with adjective expressions in that the latter can by themselves convey a tolerably precise meaning. Cf. Ru. 967: *ego illum novi quois nunc est, tu illum quois antehac fuit*, which illustrates the fact that any degree of precision destroys the indefinite construction. In Ru. 83 "quouismodi" is merely emphatic, "*what a storm!*"

New words are required to define a new concept or combination of concepts; or to define a familiar concept, because the

leicht einen verschiedenen begrifflichen Inhalt—um wieviel leichter also einen besonderen Stimmungsgehalt, einen komischen oder verächtlichen Nebensinn. Auch in einzelnen Familien bildet sich gar leicht eine besondere Sprache heraus, und der in diesen Kreis tretende Fremde hat sich erst dem besonderen Gefühlston mancher Ausdrücke anzubequemen, ehe er die andern völlig versteht oder von ihnen verstanden wird. Endlich könnte man sogar sagen, dass bei der einzelnen Person sich gewisse Wörter mit unwillkürlichen und unwiderruflichen Begleitgefühlen verketteten.—Erdmann, Die Bedeutung des Wortes, p. 124.

term previously used has become inadequate on account of a shift of meaning. Ru. 508/9: *scelestiozem cenam cenavi tuam/quam quae Thyestae † quondam antepositast et Tereo*; the concept that is here compared with that of the dinner is complicated by reason of the fact that it would require a dvandva compound for univerbal expression. There seems no adjective corresponding to Tereus, and in Plautus' time none corresponding to Thyestes. "Thyesteus" occurs in classical Latin; and Ovid, P. IV, 6, 47, *utque Thyestae redeant si tempora mensae*, is a good example to contrast with Ru. 508/9. Sometimes the new term is a mere agglutination, as in the case of preposition with verb or adjective. On account of the idea of nearness associated with "sub" in such phrases as "sub montem," compounds with sub are freely formed; e. g., Ru. 423: *subvoluturium—illud quidem subaquilum volui dicere*. "Aquilus" is itself defined Paul. Fest. 22: *aquilus color est fuscus et subniger*.¹⁵ On page 1773 alone of Harper's *Lexicon* twenty-two compounds of sub appear as *ὑπαξ λεγόμενα*. Other compounds are agglutinative determinative, which, however, did not thrive in Latin. Good examples are the dependent adjective compounds in the *Attis* of Catullus; *hederigera*, 23: *ubi capita maenades vi iaciunt hederigerae*; *silvicultrix* and *memorivagus*, 72: *ubi cerva silvicultrix, ubi aper memorivagus*; and the possessive properipes, 34: *rapidum ducem secuntur Gallae properipedem*. Cf. Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar* 1265, 1293 ff. Three of these compounds are starred in Harper's *Lexicon*. These *ὑπαξ λεγόμενα*, so far as we can judge from the evidence, represent the formation of a new word, or rather its emergence into literature; but the concepts which they represented were not of sufficient importance to require a separate expression, or some other word was more satisfactory to the public. "Perhiberi" in the sense of "dici" in the comedians is an instance of arrested development.

"Ambulator" appears first in Cato, "ambulatix" appears nowhere else. R. R. 5, 2: *vilicus ne sit ambulator*; *ibid.* 143, 1: *uxor vilici ad cenam nequo eat, neve ambulatix siet*. The word in either gender denotes a specific sort of idler; it is probable

¹⁵So that a comparison by diminution could be established: *niger*, *aquilus*, *subniger*.

that no one else felt the need of the definition of this particular kind of idler, as there are adjectives in use, and as the distinction from other kinds of idleness is not very clear-cut. "Abactor" occurs first in literature in Apuleius, *Met.* VII, 26: *abactorem indubitatum, cruentumque percussorem*; possibly the use of the word here is due to the desire for a formal hendiadys. It is defined by Isidore, *Orig.* 10, 14: *est fur iumentorum et pecorum quem vulgo abigeum vocant*. There is no etymological reason why "abactor" should be "fur"; it might etymologically and logically quite as well mean "defensor," i. e., "abactor hostium." The term is defined with great precision by the jurist Paulus Sententarius, *Sent.* 5, 18, 1: *abactores (abegectores) sunt qui unum equum vel duas equas totidemque boves (oves) vel capras decem porcos quinque abegerint*. This definition furnishes an example of the precision necessary in technical vocabulary. "Abigeus" also comes in for a technical definition; Ulpian, *Dig.* 42, 14, 1, 1 (Goetz, *Archiv*, I (1884) 561): *abigei autem proprie hi habentur qui pecora ex pascuis vel ex armentis subtrahunt, et quodammodo deprædantur, et abigendi studium quasi artem exercent, equos de gregibus vel boves de armentis abducentes*. Ceterum si quis bovem aberrantem vel equos in solitudine relictos abduxerit, non est abigeus sed fur potius. The present participle appears first in Pliny; the singular *N. H.* 8, 142: *canem . . . volucres ac feras abigentem*; the plural *ibid.* 8, 91: *delphini abigentes eos (sc. crocodilos) prædam*. The verb "cancellare" appears first in Columella, *R. R.* IV, 2: *haec (sc. vitis) autem quæ toto est prostrata corpore cum inferius solum quasi cancellavit atque irretivit, cratem facit*. The vine makes a lattice-work on the ground. Thence the term was applied to the act of striking out with the mark "x"; thence to the act of annulling, in which latter significations it survives in English. The verb when first used marked a concept of sufficient importance and frequency to require separate definition in ordinary speech.

The introduction of a new science or the development of a science which is not new requires new terms. Quintilian furnishes many examples of the adaptation of terms, sometimes taken bodily from Greek, sometimes translated; *Inst. Orat.* IX, 4, 22: *at illa connexa series tres habet formas: incisa, quæ κόμματα dicuntur, membra, quæ κῶλα, περίοδον quæ est vel am-*

bitus, vel circumductum, vel continuatio vel conclusio; ibid. 3, 81: contrapositum, autem, vel, ut quidam vocant, contentio (*ἀντίθετον* dicitur) non uno fit modo; VIII, 3, 50: sicut *ταυτολογία* id est eiusdem verbi aut sermonis iteratio; ibid. 53: vitanda *μακρολογία* id est longior quam oportet sermo . . . est et *πλεονασμός* vitium, cum supervacuis verbis oratio oneratur; ibid. 55: est etiam quae *περιεργία* vocatur, supervacua, ut sic dixerim, operositas. Quintilian adopts *κακόζηλον* as a Latin word, ibid. 58: est autem omne *κακόζηλον* utique falsum, etiamsi non omne falsum *κακόζηλον*. Cacozelon vero est quod dicitur aliter quam se natura habet et quam oportet, et quam sat est; as Lucretius adopts "homoeomeria" because there is no Latin word for it: De Rerum Nat. I, 830/2, nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian / quam Grai memorant, nec nostra dicere lingua / concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas.

This paper is merely a suggestion as to some of the main principles that govern the linguistic expression of concepts. If the holophrastic condition of very primitive speech is assumed,¹⁶ the first necessity for the convenient interchange of ideas, the differentiation of the holophrase into its component parts, had been carried very far when the first Latin now extant appears, though the analysis of the verb has been carried farther. Single words, the separate counters of speech, were available to represent most ordinary things and ideas with facility. The process of recombination to represent more concisely new or more abstract concepts was going on all through the literary period. The greater concreteness of many Latin expressions may be an evidence of this fact; e. g., *res gestae*, qui in re publica versantur, and other periphrases used in Latin where in English or Greek an abstract term would be employed, and the borrowing of philosophical and technical terms so largely from the Greek. The univocal expression of concepts not previously so expressed was being developed as at present and the process must continue so long as language is a vehicle of thought. Linguistic develop-

¹⁶ Cf. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie*, Erster Band, Zweiter Teil, pp. 633-4; and also p. 635: Als eine Ausdrucksbewegung, was sie (i. e., die Sprache) auf allen ihren Entwicklungsstufen bleibt, geht sie vollkommen kontinuierlich aus der Gesamtheit der Ausdrucksbewegungen hervor, die das animalische Leben überhaupt kennzeichnen.

ment corresponds not inaptly to the Spencerian formula; it is a change from an indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity, to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity.

So far the problem is relatively simple, but a number of questions remain to be asked. There are elements of concepts apparently frequent in occurrence, simple, and not detailed, that do not seem to lend themselves readily to absorption into a univocal expression. To select two, the ideas of alternation and proximity ("almostness" would convey the second idea better): ad Fam. III, 6, 5, *quid ageres aut ubi te visurus essem*, raises the question of alternation; Pl. Capt. 20, *quia quasi una aetas erat*, or Pliny Ep. VII, 20, 3, *propemodum aequales*, that of proximity. It is interesting to note that Harper's *Lexicon* gives only three examples of "paeninsula."¹⁷ Or, to take another example in Latin, why are verbs in Latin not compounded with the negative prefix "in"?¹⁸ These questions and others of a similar nature cannot be answered here. They call for a separate investigation, and may be insoluble. They lead to metaphysics, while what has been done in this paper does not transgress the limits of linguistic psychology. Nevertheless, these questions, whether insoluble or not, are insistent. Grammarians avoid metaphysics as far as possible, and they do well. The reaction against the illegitimate intrusion of *a priori* metaphysical concepts that resulted in logical categories to which speech was made to conform has cleared the ground from useless lumber and made a science of language possible; but when inductive study has built up this science there still remains the question of its relation to metaphysics. It may be that the consideration of such problems as here suggested would do something toward establishing the boundaries of grammar and metaphysics; for ultimately grammar, as well as all other sciences, must come to an understanding with philosophy.

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¹⁷ Cf. Merrill's note to Catullus, 31, 1.

¹⁸ Cf. Lindsay, *L. L.*, p. 363.